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Abstract 
From the 1980s onwards discourses of risk have continued to grow, almost in ubiquity. 
Ideas and practices of risk and risk aversion have extended to UK mental health care 
where services are expected to assess and manage risks, and high quality clinical 
assessment has been revised to incorporate risk assessment. This article problematises 
practices of risk assessment in mental health provision, focusing on the base rate 
problem. It presents an analysis of audio recordings of risk assessments completed within 
a primary care mental health service. The analysis is informed by a critical logics 
approach which, using ideas from discourse theory as well as Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
involves developing a set of logics to describe, analyse and explain social phenomena., 
We characterise the assessments as functioning according to social logics of well-oiled 
administration and preservation, whereby bureaucratic processes are prioritised, 
contingency ironed out or ignored and a need to manage potential risks to the service are 
the dominant operational frames. These logics are considered in terms of their beatific 
and horrific fantasmatic dimensions, whereby risk assessment is enacted as infallible 
(beatific) until clients become threats (horrific), creating a range of potential false 
negatives, false positives and so forth. These processes function to obscure or background 
problems with risk assessment, by generating practices that favour and offer protection to 
assessors, at the expense of those being assessed, thus presenting a challenge to the stated 
aim of risk assessment practice. 
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Risk assessment practice within primary 
mental health care: a logics perspective 
From the 1980s onwards discourses of risk have continued to grow, almost in ubiquity. 
Ideas and practices of risk and risk aversion have extended to UK mental health care 
where services are expected to assess and manage risks, and high quality clinical 
assessment has been revised to incorporate risk assessment. This article problematises 
practices of risk assessment in mental health provision, focusing on the base rate 
problem. It presents an analysis of audio recordings of risk assessments completed within 
a primary care mental health service. Using a critical logics approach, the assessments are 
characterised as functioning according to social logics of well-oiled administration and 
preservation, whereby bureaucratic processes are prioritised, contingency ironed out or 
ignored and a need to manage potential risks to the service are the dominant operational 
frames. These logics are considered in terms of their beatific and horrific fantasmatic 
dimensions, whereby risk assessment is enacted as infallible (beatific) until clients 
become threats (horrific), creating a range of potential false negatives, false positives and 
so forth. These processes function to obscure or background problems with risk 
assessment, by generating practices that favour and offer protection to assessors, at the 
expense of those being assessed. This presents a challenge to the stated aim of risk 
assessment practice, and given the global ubiquity of risk in mental health assessments, 
this research has international implications for the study of risk and mental health. 
Introduction  
Risk has become a familiar contemporary concept, frequently encountered in many areas 
of twenty-first century life. Risk discourse is now pervasive and seemingly essential, with 
organisations needing comprehensive risk management strategies and practices to be seen 
as commercially viable (Power, 2004). Within academic research, risk is a topic 
frequently studied, and interest in risk and risk assessment as an area of research has 
proliferated since the 1980s. As one example, Risk Analysis: An International Journal, 
first released in 1981, published 523 articles in the 1990s and this rose to 2,739 between 
2000 and 2009 (Wiley Online Library, n.d.).  
 
Within the area of mental health care, published research varies in scope and 
intention. Broadly speaking, there is a body of work discussing methods of risk 
assessment (Buchanan, 1999); risk assessment instruments (Phull, 2012); different 
theoretical approaches to risk assessment (Doctor, 2004; Holloway, 2004; Witteman, 
2004); assessment of different kinds of risk, such as risk of violence (Langan, 2010) and 
risk of suicide (Cutcliffe and Barker, 2004). There is also work that has explored the 
practice of risk assessment from the perspective of those involved (Aflague and Ferszt, 
2010; Godin, 2004; Moerman, 2012), and approaches using poststructuralist ideas to 
engage with risk (Crowe & Carlyle, 2003; Rose, 1998). 
 While the research focusing on risk assessment varies widely, it has highlighted 
some problematic aspects of risk assessment and management, elaborated in the 
problematisation presented below. Despite this, within mental health provision, service 
providers are expected to assess, manage and reduce all types of risks, in particular the 
risk of suicide and violence. This research explores the impact of such risk practices by 
analysing the quotidian everyday aspect of risk assessment practice within a primary care 
mental health service. This article adds to the existing literature through an engagement 
with actual clinical practice as the source of empirical data and through its use of the 
logics framework and the distinct ontological position this provides. 
After outlining the theoretical framework underpinning this paper, we develop a 
threefold problematisation of risk assessment. This involves considering the ignoble 
origins of risk assessment through exploring the policy context surrounding its 
emergence, and considering problems with it, most notably the base-rate problem. 
Consideration is then given to the consequences of current practices surrounding risk 
assessment. Drawing upon existing research, the argument we develop is that risk 
assessment is problematic due to numerous issues including inaccuracy, the selective 
nature of the risks considered, encouragement of defensive practice, as well as practices 
that increase stigma and reduce trust.  
After presenting the empirical context and material, the article characterises the 
risk assessment practice studied as functioning according to a logic of well-oiled 
administration and a logic of preservation. The logic of well-oiled administration 
involved a bureaucratic focus which privileged obtaining and documenting information 
with clients fitting around the institutional working of the service. When the logic of 
preservation was operating, a horrific fantasy of risk assessment being inaccurate came 
into effect, which corresponded with the false positive and false negative possibilities of 
assessment. This led to practices which prioritised reducing the risks to practitioners and 
the service over and above supporting people with risks they face. This contradicts the 
stated aims of risk assessment within clinical and policy documentation. We draw from a 
critical logics approach, which requires a degree of theoretical work in setting up and 
demonstrating the particular problematisation of risk assessment practices that we utilise 
in this paper.  
Research Methodology: A Logics Approach 
Theoretical Context 
This article draws upon a Logics of Critical Explanation framework (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007). This framework has its roots in discourse theory, in particular Laclau 
and Mouffe’s (1985) poststructuralist conception of discourse where all actions, social 
practices and regimes (systems of practices) are seen as discursive in nature to reflect the 
view that meaning is central to all human practices. The focus in not on establishing 
universal or causal laws, or on providing contextualized understandings of actor’s 
interpretations. Instead, the focus in on articulating how objects, such as risk assessment 
practices, acquire an identity through discourses within a given social and historical 
context, and how this relies upon a contingent articulation of elements to establish a 
hegemonic discourse. 
A series of ontological presuppositions inform the approach, with radical 
contingency viewed as structuring the entire discursive field. This leads to an inherent 
instability: ‘radical contingency opposes empirical contingency’s sense of possibility 
with a sense of impossibility; the constitutive failure of any objectivity to attain a full 
identity’ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 110). There is therefore a radical contingency 
about the elements, linguistic and material, that constitute the social world, leading to a 
structural incompleteness in any system. This leads to a focus not on essence or cause, 
but on contingency and historicity. In terms of risk, this means that for us, risk 
assessment is not regarded as an intrinsic, essential component of mental health care but 
one way of doing things with a particular history linked to the projects of certain actors. 
The logics approach involves developing a problematisation through 
archaeological and genealogical work within a discourse theoretical frame. Drawing upon 
a retroductive mode of reasoning, linking discovery with explanation, it creates an 
interrelated view of research with three stages: problematising phenomena, retroductive 
explanation, and persuasion and intervention in a community. Through a process of 
articulation, it characterises the practices being investigated using the relevant logics, 
their need for analysis using an archaeology and their political and ideological emergence 
through genealogy.  
Central to this form of critical explanation are social, political and fantasmatic 
logics. Social logics are the rules or grammar of a practice which enable the purpose, 
form and content to be seen. They can be thought of as patterned social practices, tied to 
historical contexts. Political logics show the institution, sedimentation or contestation of 
these social practices. Fantasmatic logics refer to the ideological grip of a particular 
practice or regime. The concept of fantasy is used to explain why practices resist or 
embrace change, with fantasy operating to obscure the radical contingency of the social 
world and thus promising closure (Glynos, 2001).  
As an example, in a health care context, a social logic of choice would instantiate 
practices that prioritise autonomy and the right to decide for oneself, whereas a social 
logic of care would prioritise alternative practices such as the doctor-patient relationship 
or developing knowledge (see Mol, 2008). Understanding the political logics involved in 
this would require detailed diachronic analysis to see how concepts like choice came 
about within a healthcare context, for example through tracking the introduction and 
contestation of market based ideas within health care (see Glynos, Speed and West, 
2015). Fantasmatic logics capture the appeal of such practices; in this example one 
fantasmatic element could be how the market ‘promises’ to function as a panacea for a 
range of complex problems within the organisation and delivery of healthcare.  
Problematisation 
Policy Context 
The contemporary importance given to managing risk was underscored by a UK 
Government 2007 publication of Best Practice in Managing Risk, which emphasised the 
dual objectives of patient autonomy and public safety, and re-described a good 
therapeutic relationship to include an ‘objective assessment of risk’ as well as providing 
‘sympathetic support’ (Department of Health, 2007: 3). We consider the publication of 
this document as a culmination of risk discourse within healthcare policy, which first 
appeared in the early 1990s as community care was being instantiated as a policy 
imperative. 
By 1990, the Government had introduced the National Health Service and 
Community Care Act. In the following years, several high-profile incidents occurred in 
the community. One particularly high-profile case, which had a direct influence on 
policy, was the random killing of Jonathan Zito by Christopher Clunis in 1992 at a train 
station. Clunis, who had a diagnosis of schizophrenia, had been in and out of psychiatric 
services during the five years preceding this incident. The health secretary, Virginia 
Bottomley, responded by ordering a review of the law surrounding community care 
received by psychiatric patients following hospital discharge, arguing not enough 
mechanisms existed to support ‘those most at risk’ (The Guardian, 1993: 1). Press 
coverage grew as Zito’s wife, Jayne, called for a public inquiry, opposition politicians 
called for a suspension of plans to close psychiatric units and a review of community care 
arrangements and resources, and the British Medical Association and mental health 
charities argued for additional funding and resources for community care. 
The findings of the private inquiry, the Ritchie report, echoed the call of a need 
for more funding and resources and recommended the establishment of risk registers 
(Ritchie et al., 1994). These were introduced two months later to support supervised 
discharge, and provide information on patients at risk of serious violence, suicide, or self-
neglect. The decision to place someone on the register was said to rest with the 
responsible consultant psychiatrist in liaison with the team and to be based on detailed 
evidence. 
Critics described the registers as harmful, colluding with an ‘exercise designed to 
shift accountability and [which] disguises poor psychiatric provision’ (O’Connor et al., 
1994: 1237). The registers were said to be an attempt to distract people from the crisis of 
community care, such as the need for more community services, 24-hour crisis centres 
and supported accommodation (Press Association, 1993). Bottomley (1994) insisted 
however that the registers would help systematise risk assessment and management 
processes. Some leading psychiatrists agreed, describing risk registers as ‘the glue that 
will hold together all the components of care for those people who cannot hold them 
together for themselves, and no longer have a mental hospital to do it for them’ (Tyrer 
and Kennedy, 1995: 193). Risk assessment became increasingly formalised in subsequent 
years as health care policy shifted towards processes of clinical governance under the 
New Labour Government (Department of Health, 1998), which made chief executives of 
NHS Trusts accountable for providing recommended treatments, improving service 
quality, and obligated to have clear policies specifying risk assessment and management 
(McPherson et al., 2003).  
Risk Assessment Practices 
The increasing significance of risk assessment within policy was in line with a 
broader cultural expansion of risk discourse. In mental health, debate has mostly focused 
on methods of assessment, centring on accuracy and prediction. An initial clinical 
approach involved professionals making judgements following unstructured assessments. 
This was criticised as being anecdotal, subjective, unreliable, and often based on 
insufficient information (Monahan, 1981). Clinicians were not felt to possess particular 
expertise in predicting risk, with knowledge of past violence seen as more accurate 
(Langan, 2010). These purported failings led to the development of an actuarial approach, 
which involved the development and application of risk assessment tools to identify static 
or historical factors statistically associated with an increased risk (i.e. risk factors). While 
these actuarial approaches were given legitimacy through purported objectivity and 
scientificity, they suffered from what has been termed the base-rate problem, i.e. the 
difficulty of predicting a behaviour that occurs rarely within a population studied, like 
violence or suicide within the general population.  
Typically, risk assessment tools are considered in terms of 1) sensitivity, i.e. their 
ability to correctly identify those at risk, and 2) specificity, i.e. their ability to correctly 
identify those not at risk (Duggan, 1997). Tests have four categories of response, they can 
correctly identify those at risk (true positive), or not at risk (true negative), incorrectly 
identify those at risk as not at risk (false negative), or not at risk as being at risk (false 
positive). A test with low sensitivity will have a high number of false negatives and a test 
with low specificity will have a high number of false positives. Positive predictive values 
refer to the proportion of individuals correctly predicted by a test to be at risk and 
negative predictive values, the proportion correctly predicted to not be at risk. These 
values are influenced by the prevalence of the behaviour being studied. Using Duggan’s 
(1997) example, hypothetically in a population of 100, where 10 are violent, a test with 
90% sensitivity and 95% specificity would give a positive predictive value of 64% and a 
negative predictive value of 99%. This would mean 64% (9 people) of those the test 
identifies as being violent would be violent (i.e. true positive), and 36% (5 people) 
identified as being violent would not be violent (i.e. false positives). This test would 
correctly identify 99% (85 people) of non-violent people (i.e. true negative) and 1% (1 
person) would be identified as not being a risk when in fact they were (i.e. false 
negatives).  
When the prevalence rate changes to 10 in 1000 people (1%), the same test would 
maintain a high negative predictive value of 99% but the positive predictive value 
reduces to 13%. This means the test would incorrectly identify 59 people as violent (false 
positive), and incorrectly identify one violent individual as non-violent (false negative). 
In this case, the majority (86.8%) of those the test identified as violent would be false 
positives. This clearly shows a problem with the application of such tests in cases where 
the behaviour is rare within the population. As Szmukler (2001: 85) puts it: ‘even a test 
with an impossible 0.9 accuracy for both true positives and true negatives will be wrong 
more than nine times out of ten at a base rate of 1%’. Another hypothetical example, 
classifying patients into high or low risk categories, with an optimal risk assessment, 
shows that 35,000 successful risk management programmes would be required to prevent 
one homicide by patients with schizophrenia (Large et al., 2011). Discussing this problem 
elsewhere, Szmukler and Rose (2013: 129) conclude that the sort of events which these 
assessments are designed to prevent ‘are not statistically predictable in a clinically useful 
way when it comes to an individual patient’. 
In response, since the 2000s, a combination of the clinical and actuarial approach, 
termed structured professional judgement, has been described as the preferred method of 
assessment, drawing upon a combination of professional knowledge of an individual, 
clinical experience and empirically validated risk factors (Lamont and Brunero, 2009). 
However, combining these methods does not solve the base rate problem. The Royal 
College of Psychiatry (2008: 10) state accurate assessment of risk is ‘never possible for 
individual patients…the risks posed by those with mental disorders are much less 
susceptible to prediction because of the multiplicity of, and complex interrelation of, 
factors underlying a person’s behaviour’. Moving to a structured professional judgement 
also leaves other issues unresolved such as the difficulty of multiple interacting risk 
factors, difficulties in acquiring accurate information, and how to incorporate actuarial 
information and prevent or minimise risk (Langan, 2010). 
The inability of assessment to accurately predict risk is simultaneously surprising 
and unsurprising. It is surprising in the sense that it has such a grip over mental health 
practices, despite the fundamental impossibility of the task. It is unsurprising from the 
ontological position of radical contingency taken in this paper, which rejects those efforts 
to develop assessment that reflect a positivist logic encouraging a focus on refining tools, 
incremental improvement, and a belief that complete knowledge of the social world is 
fully realisable. The problems with risk assessment have not been used to reconsider the 
practice, or reflect on its epistemological assumptions or historical development. Instead, 
risk assessment has become a routine, taken for granted part of conventional mental 
health practice. This provides an example of what Verhaeghe (2008: 71) describes as a 
common solution to an epistemological problem, anticipated by Socrates: ‘if epistèmè 
(knowledge) is unable to found arètè (truth), people fall back on doxa (opinion)’. 
In this context, the need for risk assessment is less about its intrinsic properties 
and more about the social function it serves and the need to demonstrate its utility, as 
evidenced in its UK development as a response to the Zito case. This justification can 
also be seen in Maden’s (2005: 1) argument for structured professional judgement. He 
described how confidence in the psychiatric profession was low and that ‘once the public 
and politicians have made violence a major issue, services need to be seen to be taking it 
seriously. Structured risk assessment is not the whole answer, but it sends the right 
message’. This brings into view the social role performed by risk assessment in relation 
to the mental health professions. With the instantiation of community care, and incidents 
like those involving Clunis, perhaps this social function became more ambiguous and risk 
assessment was a way of restoring it. The shift towards treating people in the community 
rather than in psychiatric units (a global rather than local UK phenomenon) increased the 
visibility of the risk patients posed, real or imagined, and it was in this context that risk 
assessment became strategically useful as a way of enabling risk assessors to take on the 
role of protecting the public, previously provided by incarceration (Foucault, 2001). 
Importantly, this also aligned with the dominant policy drive to reduce expenditure.  
Marginalised Risks 
Both the quest for the perfect system of assessment and reliance upon convention 
obscure a range of significant issues linked to risk assessment. Assessment tends to focus 
on risks people with mental health diagnoses pose which marginalises consideration of 
other risks like living in inadequate accommodation (Godin, 2004). It constructs 
individuals as risks who need interventions rather than identifying issues within particular 
communities, such as those with higher levels of poverty, substance abuse and 
unemployment (Wand, 2012). It may also obscure risks that come from accessing mental 
health services which potentially include loss of liberty, forced treatment, or negative 
experiences (Vassilev and Pilgrim, 2007).  
There are also risks that emerge from risk assessment when considered in relation 
to a cultural emphasis on accountability and litigation. It may encourage defensive 
practice with patients coming to be regarded as a source of threat. This threat may be 
constituted as material, reputational or professional, if, for example, the professional is 
shown to have assessed risk erroneously. This leads to what Power (2004) describes as 
secondary risk management where professionals manage their own risks rather than the 
primary task for which they are employed, such as providing a mental health service to a 
patient.  
This creates a new kind of expert, one skilled at managing the risks posed to one’s 
reputation through defensive practice, and, by implication, substituting clinical expertise 
for administrative accountability. Undrill (2007: 295) identifies this as a response to 
anxiety about future uncertainty; while anxiety may be tamed through assessment, it may 
also be displaced onto the assessor and potentially create a situation where ‘a patient may 
be detained because not detaining them produces intolerable anxiety in the staff 
involved’. Risk assessment then can become a form of insurance for professionals who 
are encouraged to make decisions ‘from the perspective of the need to justify it in some 
public tribunal in the future’ (Rose, 1998: 186). This may in part explain why pro-formas 
used by services tend to focus on risks professionals may be held accountable for at the 
expense of other risks (Hawley et al., 2006).  
More broadly, such practices may influence trust and stigma. Douglas (1992) 
describes risk as equivalent to a secular form of sin, and as fulfilling a similar function to 
practices of confinement within Victorian asylums. It becomes an acceptable form of 
stigma as high-risk individuals are seen as legitimate moral concerns predicated on the 
assumption they pose an unacceptable level of danger. This bypasses concerns about 
discriminating against people with a psychiatric diagnosis, yet maintains an association 
between mental illness and danger, thus reinforcing stigma and authoritarian practices. 
This may undermine the necessary context for effective treatment and lead to people not 
wanting to access services due to taking time away from building therapeutic 
relationships and patients wondering what professionals’ priorities are compromising 
trust (Szmukler and Rose, 2013). 
Empirical Material and Analysis 
The empirical material included in this paper were audio recordings of risk 
assessments completed within an Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) 
service. IAPT was a government initiative launched in 2008 and involved the creation of 
new psychological therapy services across England to treat depression and anxiety 
disorders (Department of Health, 2008). 
The assessments analysed were duty screening telephone assessments which 
aimed to assess suitability for the service. They were completed following receipt of an 
urgent referral. They aimed to clarify the problem, assess the level of risk, discuss 
previous or current treatment, provide information about the service and decide about 
appropriate support. They followed a pro-forma and ranged between forty and fifty-five 
minutes. Service documentation specified a range of criteria for access organised around 
mental health disorders, and a range of exclusion criteria, one being an assessment of 
significant levels of risk to self or others within the past three months. 
There were nine participants in this research. Six of the participants were people 
receiving assessments, referred to as clients. They were all aged over 18, four were male 
and two, female. Three participants took part in their roles as high intensity cognitive 
behavioral practitioners. Two practitioners were female and one, male, and the 
practitioners who completed the duty screening assessments were all considered senior 
members of clinical staff. The assessments took place in the participating service and 
were recorded via a digital recorder connected to a telephone. They were collected over a 
six-month period. A total of eight assessments were recorded with the initial aim being to 
collect six to eight assessments. Two of the assessments were not used in the analysis due 
to clients changing their mind about participation following their assessments. As the 
assessments follow a pro-forma there were similarities across the assessments although 
the analysis presented here, in line with the approach taken, is not attempting to describe 
the ‘truth’ of risk assessment practice but a critical explanation of the material studied in 
line with a view of the social world as radically contingent. All participants provided 
written informed consent, and the study obtained ethical approval from an NHS 
committee and the Research and Development Department of the participating Trust. 
The analytical process involved a structured application of the logics framework 
following the theoretical perspective described. The assessments were transcribed and the 
analysis involved an iterative process of reading and listening to the assessments before 
labelling aspects of the empirical material as social, political and fantasmatic logics. 
Patterns were explored and the logics were reworked throughout the analysis to develop 
an overall articulation. To identify logics, the focus was on understanding what was 
taking place within the interaction between participants to characterise the way risk was 
assessed (social), considering alliances informing the interaction (political) and evidence 
of beatific and horrific dimensions of fantasy to provide an explanation as to why 
participants invested in the practice (fantasmatic). As political logics require a more 
diachronic form of analysis which the empirical material did not provide, these were 
backgrounded here. 
Findings 
The empirical material will now be presented as part of an overall critical 
explanation. This is followed by an elaboration of the social logics that operated within 
the duty screening assessments and consideration of these social logics in relation to 
fantasmatic logics.  
Empirical Extracts 
Extract 1 provides an example of how a practitioner, Nick (pseudonyms used 
throughout), explained the assessment format. It shows the emphasis placed upon 
administrative and bureaucratic process. Nick referred to items from the pro-forma, used 
to structure the assessments, including completing a ‘set questionnaire’, ‘some other 
added questions relating to risk’ and ‘some other questions…relating to other conditions’.  
Extract 1  
1 Nick: just ticking the right boxes here okay…so what we’re gonna do is 
2  we’re going to go through the assessment in three parts first of all 
3  we’ve got a set questionnaire to go through now I’m not sure were you 
4  sent that in the post 
5 David: there was something came in the post yeah 
6 Nick: right have you had an opportunity to look at that 
7 David: yeah I've had a look through it 
8 Nick: okay so we're gonna go through that if you've had a chance to complete 
9  it we'll look at what your responses are and what we've got here 
10 David: well I've looked at it I haven't actually completed it but 
11 Nick: Okay 
12 David: I can yeah 
13 Nick: okay well we'll go through that now but if you do have it in front of 
14  you it's useful for the answers 
15 David: Yeah 
16 Nick: and part of that I've just got some other added questions relating to risk 
17  these are questions that we ask clients just to check that they're safe 
18  and that they're okay 
19 David: Mmm 
20 Nick: Okay 
21 David: Mm 
22 Nick: following on from that we'll have the main part of the assessment an 
23  opportunity for you to explain you know what your difficulties are and 
24  some other questions that I've got relating to other conditions just to 
25  screen those conditions 
26 David: Mmhmm 
27 Nick: and then we'll talk about what options are available based on what 
28  we've discussed 
 
While this extract demonstrates how Nick clearly explained or normalised the 
assessment process, it also highlights the administrative focus. Initially, Nick tests the 
process has worked as it should (i.e. the postal questionnaire, lines 1-3). This functions to 
establish that process has been followed. Receipt of the questionnaire then completely 
determines the shape of the rest of the interaction. In line 13 Nick asserts having the form 
to hand is useful for the answers, reinforcing by implication a set pattern of response. The 
accuracy of the instrument will only be enhanced if responses are confined to its 
predetermined parameters, downplaying the risk of any false results. Risk assessment was 
here presented as capable of straightforwardly knowing if people are safe and okay, 
through the structured administration of a questionnaire, speaking to the beatific 
dimension of fantasmatic logics. It features as a taken-for-granted aspect of mental health 
practice. This extract also demonstrates how client’s explaining their difficulties is said to 
be the main part of the assessment but is actually subordinated to other aspects, like 
completing the questionnaire and risk questions. Even when the possibility of extraneous 
factors outside of the questionnaire are addressed, they are (to be) controlled (screened 
for) through the use of the instrument (lines 24-25).  
Extract 2  
1 Mary: [typing] 
2 Claire: you can type quick 
3 Mary: just about 
4 Claire: ha ha ha 
5 Mary: I am getting there when I look through there’s a lot of abc corrections 
Extract 2 demonstrates how recording information that could be utilised for 
decision-making processes was prioritised over other aspects, such as the client’s 
perspective or experience of the assessment. The importance placed upon documenting 
information was evident from Mary typing, illustrating the primacy of the administrative 
rather than therapeutic role, or rather that the therapeutic task was subsumed within the 
administrative task. The client waiting for Mary to document information shows the risk 
to practitioners of not obtaining information and thus the need to manage risks to the 
service. This administrative role could be extended with practitioners becoming 
technicians asking questions because the pro-forma required it rather than because it was 
clinically relevant as shown in extract 3. 
Extract 3 
1 Lisa: so with this assessment we look well I’m gonna go through a few things  
2  now just to rule things in or out okay 
3 Alex Yeah 
4 Lisa a kind of general screening so some of these questions won’t relate to 
5  you but it’s just to make sure 
 Lisa demonstrates in extract 3 her predominantly administrative role which could 
present a challenge to the development of clinical expertise as she became tied to the pro-
forma. The questions were bureaucratic, administrative ones rather than therapeutic ones. 
Practitioners remained faithful to the pro-forma, completion of which replaced 
professional judgement and in this sense became infallible.  
The structure of the pro-forma and emphasis on obtaining straightforward 
information positioned clients as rational, knowing subjects who had the information 
required to complete the pro-forma successfully. It came to be regarded as more reliable 
than professional judgement and worked to exclude any contingency that may arise from 
practitioner subjectivity. Client contingency was dealt with in different ways such as 
being denied from the outset, or by disallowing it (as shown in extract 4). This vignette 
followed David mentioning having thoughts he would be better off dead. 
Extract 4 
1 Nick: okay so if I can just ask you some more questions about those types of  
2  Thoughts 
3 David: Mmm 
4 Nick: just to check that you’re okay um if you can answer yes or no to these 
5  Ones 
 
Nick followed up on these suicidal thoughts asking ‘more questions’ which 
indicated this was a potential risk and brings into view the possibility of a failed 
assessment and the horrific dimension of fantasmatic logics. Nick managed this by asking 
David to answer with a ‘yes or no’, which prevented contingency from surfacing. When 
client’s acknowledged issues conceptualised as possible risks to practitioners and to the 
service, the limitations of assessment became visible. Another way this was managed was 
by encouraging clients to assist in the administrative decision-making process, as shown 
in extract 5. 
Extract 5 
1 Lisa: because this risk is you know a concern what’s your sense of that if 
2  at the end of the assessment we did think about putting you on the  
3  waiting list for treatment but you had to wait three or four months do  
4  you feel you would be safe in doing that or do you think you would  
5  need something sooner 
6 Ben: I possibly think I’d be I dunno how to answer that I think I would be  
7  okay but I do want something 
 
This extract presents Ben’s risk as a ‘concern’ and so brings in the uncertainty 
involved in assessment and thus the shadow of horrific fantasy. Lisa responded by 
inviting Ben to assess his own risk. Here, his problems were made to fit around the 
service workings as he was asked to consider his safety in relation to waiting lists. This 
shows the onus being placed on clients to confirm their own safety was one way of 
responding to the anxiety generated by assessment. The implication seemed to be that if 
Ben went on record as saying he can wait three or four months, this gives the service 
licence to wait three or four months for treatment, as if Ben had sanctioned the decision. 
The context linked to risk issues could also become extraneous information as shown in 
extract 6. 
Extract 6 
1 Lisa: the question we ask everyone is whether you feel you could be a risk to 
2  anybody else at all 
3 Ben: mmm not at the moment no 
4 Lisa: no okay 
5 Ben: well you know not unless certain situations arose but no 
6 Lisa: okay and then if you feel at risk from anybody at the moment 
 
Ben’s response to the initial question was to say ‘not at the moment no’ which 
was repeated as ‘no’. He then qualified this by acknowledging contingency linked to 
‘certain situations’ but Lisa did not enquire further and moved onto the next item. 
Therapeutically, there would be an expectation that Lisa might follow up on this 
contingency, but she does not. In this example, we see how this social practice 
encouraged practitioners to ignore or downplay the possibility of contingency. The 
assessments also involved some issues being formulated as risks whilst others were not. 
Extract 7 provides one example.  
Extract 7 
1 Mary: okay so in terms of your work has your mood had any impact on your 
2  work at all at the moment… 
3 Emily: I've had a few outbursts at the managers for being useless at their job 
4 Mary: at other staff members have you 
5 Emily: yeah well management 
6 Mary: well if they're not doing their jobs properly ha ha  
7 Emily: I know calling them a bunch of useless wankers probably [inaudible] 
8 Mary: I know how that feels ha ha ha 
9 Emily: I think most people do don't they they just don't say it 
10 Mary: that's it exactly exactly so apart from that it actually work isn't too bad  
11  a few incidents that occurred where mainly management not doing 
12  their jobs properly and you've just pretty much told them as it is yeah 
13 Emily: yeah 
 
Despite the potential personal issues involved in calling management ‘a bunch of 
useless wankers’, this behaviour was not assessed as a risk. Instead, further exploration 
occurred only around issues that potentially pose risks to the service, as conceptualised 
on the pro-forma (previous suicide attempts, current suicidal ideation, neglect, risk of 
harm to/from others). Risks to personal security via a loss of employment, stress caused 
by disciplinary actions at work, or feelings of hostility to figures of authority do not 
feature in these criteria. This potentially difficult issue was left unexplored and so no 
more was known about whether Emily was at risk of losing her job or whether her 
working conditions were linked to her accessing the service. In contrast, the extract 
below shows the exploration of an issue conceptualised as a risk to the service. 
Extract 8 
1 Lisa: do you feel you might be a risk to anybody else at all 
2 Alex: no 
3 Lisa: no do you feel at risk from anybody in any way 
4 Alex: no I don’t think so 
5 Lisa: okay you mentioned about your wife when she says abusive things  
6  does she ever get physically aggressive towards you 
7 Alex: she has done once yeah 
 
Here, the logics involved worked to facilitate further exploration of this issue. 
Instead of taking Alex’s response of ‘no I don’t think so’ at face value, Lisa, drawing 
upon information obtained earlier in the assessment, enquired further about this possible 
risk. This shows how standardised questions could generate short responses and a 
potential difficulty with the language of risk as it can be understood differently by those 
involved. Practitioners invested most effort in enquiring about the possibility of client 
suicide, showing their conceptualisation of this as a key risk to the service. 
Extract 9 
1 Nick: I just wanna check as well that you have got things like the other  
2  support numbers that we give out to clients 
3 Frank: yeah 
4 Nick: things like the crisis team numbers… have you been given those 
5 Frank: yes I’ve got all them 
6 Nick: and do you keep them on your phone or somewhere safe where you 
7  can 
8 Frank: they are logged into me phone 
9 Nick: ah that’s brilliant okay hopefully you’ve got the main crisis number … 
10  which is a sort of seven day a week twenty-four hours a day 
11 Frank: yes I’ve got that  
12 Nick: okay you’ve got that somewhere I mean it’s useful to put it on your  
13  phone also put it on a card somewhere where you can access it just in  
14  case you need it or to give it to someone that you can trust that you  
15  can you know could also have access to support if needed okay 
16 Frank: yeah 
17 Nick: okay so we’ll continue on with the assessment 
 
This extract shows one way of managing risks was to provide support numbers to 
clients. It may be that this genuinely helped Frank but it is interesting to note that 
providing the numbers was prioritised over considering whether he would use them or 
further exploration of the suicidal thoughts. This suggests that knowing a client has 
access to these numbers manages any risks to practitioners that may result from a failure 
in assessment. Another way of managing risks was to obtain assurances from clients they 
were not at risk as seen in extract 10. This involved Ben who had mentioned self-harming 
and a previous suicide attempt. 
Extract 10 
1 Lisa: okay so if I were to say this is a bit of a strange question to be asked  
2  but…if I were to say out of ten how likely is it that you might act on  
3  these thoughts in the near future nought meaning I’m not going to as  
4  things are 
5 Ben: Right 
6 Lisa: you know taking out the equation of serious illness or of wheelchair 
7 Ben: yeah yeah 
8 Lisa: and ten being you know imminent would you be scoring on that scale  
9  at the moment 
10 Ben: it would on the acting on the thoughts I’d put it pretty low 
11 Lisa: yes so would it be zero 
12 Ben: nought or one yeah 
 
Here, along with bracketing contingency, obtaining a numerical rating of likely 
future action enabled this assessment to progress. It may be that having this information 
recorded managed the risks to the practitioner. The logics at play led to a focus on 
obtaining information that could obviate the service and practitioner of any blame should 
someone confound the assessment. In this case, it could be demonstrated Ben had been 
assessed but not fully disclosed his level of risk. This could therefore create a problematic 
incentive to get clients to say the right things as opposed to actually helping with the 
primary risk issue. From this view, the object of risk assessment becomes avoiding 
potential damage to the organisation rather than to the client which presents a 
considerable challenge to the process of supporting people who may be, as in this case, 
feeling suicidal. It also demonstrates why practitioners may invest in dutifully completing 
risk assessments as a way of ensuring protection from the service who function in the role 
of guarantor. 
Discussion 
The analysis of these extracts led to the development of two key social logics that 
operated within the social practice of duty screening assessments in primary care. These 
were a logic of well-oiled administration and a logic of preservation. These social logics 
were considered in relation to fantasmatic logics which taken together enables a 
characterisation of the actual practice of risk assessment studied as well as offering 
insight into why the practice is completed in the way it is despite its problematic aspects. 
Fantasmatic logics are concerned with the ways in which particular sets of 
discursive practices gain a hold upon a particular field, so in this case, how the 
fantasmatic appeals of risk assessment have come to heavily influence the work of 
practitioners. Fantasmatic logics consist of beatific and horrific dimensions. Beatific 
fantasy relates to narratives structured around ideals of complete social harmony or 
efficiency, whereas horrific fantasy works in the opposite direction, presenting threats 
that need to be curtailed to prevent catastrophic decline. Applying fantasmatic logics to 
the base rate problem, and thus the practice of assessing risks, a true positive or true 
negative assessment capture the beatific aspects where risks and non-risks are correctly 
and unproblematically identified. False positives and false negatives reflect the horrific 
dimension, the problem of inaccuracy and the possibility of people being assessed as 
risks when they are not, or worse, people not being assessed as risks when they actually 
are. In the context studied, risk assessment was used to ascertain suitability for the service 
with people presenting with significant risks being deemed unsuitable. So the horrific 
dimension involved a fear of denying access to someone who needed it through a false 
positive assessment, or, worse, granting access to someone who goes onto engage in risk 
behaviours through a false negative assessment. 
This perennial problem of accurate assessment and the anxiety generated by the 
contingency involved was dealt with through practitioners dutifully completing their 
bureaucratic and administrative tasks, a logic of well-oiled administration. It was also 
dealt with through prioritising practices that manage risks to the service, a logic of 
preservation. Here we see the beatific promise of risk assessment, stood against the 
horrific promise of a false negative. Such is the investment in the process and practice of 
risk assessment, that adherence to these practices should maximise true positives and true 
negatives and minimise false negatives and false positives, thus guaranteeing their 
protection and professional esteem. It is for the possible enjoyment (jouissance) garnered 
from accurate risk assessment (and the possible horror of inaccurate risk assessment) that 
the idea of risk assessment as a viable useful solution exerts such a grip within the field.  
The two social logics complemented each other and worked to extended risk 
practices, by making risk a mundane and quotidian feature of assessments. As the 
previous analysis demonstrated, this idea of risk as a codifier for mental health draws 
from a very specific reading of these other codifiers. Typically, this constructed the 
process of risk assessment as straightforward and infallible, ignoring limitations. When 
the horrific problem of inaccuracy featured, this was dealt with through obtaining 
mundane assurances from clients they did not present risks or through documenting 
information that demonstrated this. This meant that an emergent social practice of being 
able to demonstrate that risk had been assessed took on more significance than 
consideration of the actual type of risk the client did (or did not) pose and what the most 
appropriate clinical response to that level of risk might be. This enabled the service to 
become a guarantor for practitioners in what is potentially a high-risk situation for them 
due to the potential for professional vilification. 
Implications 
The articulation of the social logics of well-oiled administration and preservation, 
and the influence of the beatific and horrific dimensions of fantasy, is not a statement on 
the truth of risk assessment practice but an attempt at making the empirical material 
intelligible in line with a view of the social world as radically contingent. It should be 
considered in terms of its ability to provide a valid explanation of risk assessment 
practice within the context studied. Three implications will now be considered. 
Clients disappear in their actuality and become obstacles, potential false 
negatives or false positives, constituted in terms of the risks they pose 
The logics articulated led to clients being made to fit around service criteria and 
prioritised administrative process. This marginalised practices that may involve knowing 
clients in their actuality including the complexity of their lives and pasts. Contextual 
information became noise, extraneous information discursively closed down. The 
disappearance of clients aligns with what Castel (1991: 282) refers to as a shift from the 
clinic of the subject to the epidemiological clinic, which involves a move from a 
‘concrete relationship with a sick person…[to] a relationship constituted among the 
different expert assessments which make up the patient’s dossier’. 
The extended myth of risk assessment’s infallibility could lead to clients 
becoming threats or obstacles to practitioners and the service, making it difficult to 
support people with risks they face and so contradicts the stated objectives of risk 
assessment practice. This provides empirical support for Power’s (2004) description of 
secondary risk management where social actors engaged in risk assessment become 
preoccupied with managing risks that emerge from the process rather than the primary 
risks they are employed to manage. Recent work by McCabe et al. (2017) provides 
another example of how risk assessment practices can be enacted in a way that works 
against its stated aim, through assessor’s framing questions in a way that influences the 
responses provided.  
Administrative processes subordinate clinical judgement and generate 
practices of self-assessment 
The logics worked to reduce the need for analytical judgement on the part of 
practitioners who could become tied to the pro-forma. This meant practitioners took on a 
technical role (with clinical aspects marginalised). The emphasis was on recording risk 
minimisation information, such as the numerical rating of intention to act on suicidal 
thoughts. Clients were encouraged to share the responsibility for assessing risk through a 
form of self-assessment. It is tempting to see this as clients being given a greater say over 
their involvement with mental health services and so, to invert Jewson’s (1976) classic 
phrase, the reappearance of the sick man within medical cosmology. However, this was 
not the discourse of the ‘sick man’ as a totality but a fragmented discourse generated by 
service specification prioritising managing its own risks. Such self-assessment 
encouraged the inscription of risk discourse which becomes part of the canon of mental 
health service user’s discourse (Speed, 2007).   
Risk assessment becomes increasingly sedimented and its problematic 
aspects concealed 
The logics outlined work to conceal the base rate problem, assessment proceeds 
as if it is an infallible benevolent process capable of accurately identifying risks through a 
logic of well-oiled administration. The complexities surrounding the historical 
development of risk assessment practices, its conceptual problems, the policy context, 
and the moral and political dimensions surrounding risk, such as what constitutes a risk 
and to whom, remain out of sight, and this issue is not restricted to UK policy and 
practice. Rather the ubiquity of these particular approaches and models of risk mean that 
these issues are international in terms of their relevance. When the limitations of 
assessment were apparent, the logic of preservation encouraged assessors to prioritise 
managing their own risks to ensure protection from the service, and, in turn, the service 
was protected through practitioners’ dutiful assessments or documented assurances from 
clients they do not present risks. This creates a context for a potentially erroneous model 
of risk assessment to endure and even flourish, and the implications for this in an 
international policy context (and mental health practice context) must be addressed. 
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